Substantive Reform Index (SR-I)

The SR-I measures the extent to which Muslim Family Laws (MFLs) have been reformed concerning polygyny, talaq, and underage marriage (the three most-common substantive MFL concerns). As the Muslim Family Law Index (MFL-I), SR-I covers the same period and assigns each national MFL system a country-year score from the year of independence through 2016. Scores range from 0 to 100. Higher scores mean more substantive reform (e.g., raising the legal age of marriage, limiting the husband’s right to extra-judicial unilateral divorce known as talaq, or limiting polygyny.) 

A “zero” score means that the country in question does not limit polygamy, and allows extra-judicial/unilateral talaq and the marriage of children under 16 years of age. In contrast, a score of 100 signals that polygamy or talaq is abolished under the MFL in force, the minimum age of legal marriage is set at 18 or above, and no exceptions are allowed under the law. 

The index considers only substantive MFL rules applied by MFL courts (civil or religious), not criminal laws.[1]

The following formula was used to calculate and normalize the sub-index score:

SR-I: (Sum of individual scores to questions 15-17 on the scorecard)/ 6 x 100

For more information, please see the Methodology page. 

Substantive Reform Index (1946-2016)

Due to space limitations, only decennial data is presented below. The full country/year dataset can be downloaded here. The SR-I values in the table are for the current year alone (not average values).   

 

	1946	1956	1966	1976	1986	1996	2006	2016
Afghanistan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Algeria			0	0	33	33	33	33
Bangladesh				33	33	33	33	33
Cameroon			17	17	17	17	17	17
Egypt	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	50
Eritrea						17	17	17
Ethiopia	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Ghana			0	0	0	0	33	33
Greece	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
India		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Indonesia	17	17	17	50	50	50	50	50
Iran	0	0	0	33	17	17	17	17
Iraq	0	0	33	33	17	17	17	17
Israel		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jordan	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	17
Kenya			17	17	17	17	17	17
Kuwait			0	0	0	0	0	0
Lebanon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Libya		0	0	17	33	33	33	33*
Malaysia			0	0	17	33	33	33
Mali			50	50	50	50	50	50
Mauritania			0	0	0	0	33	33
Morocco		0	0	0	0	0	33	33
Myanmar		0	0	0	0	0	0	33
Niger			0	0	0	0	0	0
Nigeria			17	17	17	17	17	17
Oman				0	0	0	0	0
Pakistan		0	33	33	33	33	33	33
Philippines					33	33	33	33
Saudi Arabia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Senegal			17	50	50	50	50	50
Sierra Leone			17	17	17	17	17	17
Singapore			17	17	17	17	17	17
Somalia			0	33	33	33	33	33
Sri Lanka		0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sudan		0	0	0	17	17	17	17
Syria	0	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Tanzania			0	33	33	33	33	33
Thailand	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17
Tunisia		67	83	83	83	83	83	100
UAE				0	0	0	17	17
Uganda			17	17	17	17	17	17
Yemen			0	0	0	0	0	0

*2011, the last year for which data is available for Libya

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[1] The reason for the exclusion of criminal laws from consideration is as follows. Criminal laws do not alter substantive MFLs directly; instead, they exclusively rely upon sanctions to bring about a behavioral change in the community to curb “undesired practices” (e.g., underage marriage, polygyny, and talaq). The discrepancy between what is allowed in the criminal vs. religious law often creates normative and legal dilemmas. For instance, criminal laws often set a higher minimum age of marriage and penalize offenders for conducting religiously valid but criminally liable underage marriages. A man who contracts an underage marriage may be held criminally responsible for conducting an “invalid” marriage (according to the secular law). But he may still be required to divorce his underage wife by pronouncing talaq because according to the religious law in force, the marriage is considered “valid.”  This is why the MFL-I only takes into account direct interventions into substantive MFLs, not indirect penal interventions.